Hannibal and Wars
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In addition to the continuing operations in Spain and the abortive Carthagenian campaign in Sardinia, the war began to spread out in other directions as well. As Livy observes, "to this conflict of the two richest peoples in the world all kings and nations had turned their attention." Among those who took more than a casual interest was Philip V of Macedonia, who On first learning by report that Hannibal had crossed the Alps, although he had rejoiced at the outbreak of war between the Romans and Carthagenians, till, as their resources were not as yet known, he had wavered, uncertain which of the two peoples he wished to have the victory. Now that a third battle, a third victory, favoured the Carthagenians, he inclined to the side of success and sent ambassadors to Hannibal. These ambassadors duly located Hannibal, who agreed to an alliance by which Philip would enter the war with a fleet reported to number 200 ships, with which he would Cross to Italy and ravage the coast, and should carry on the war on land and sea with all his might. After the war was over all Italy with the city of Rome itself should belong to the Carthagenians and Hannibal, and all the booty fall to Hannibal; that after the complete subjugation of Italy, they should sail to Greece and wage war with such enemies as the king might choose; and that such states on the mainland and such islands as face Macedonia should belong to Philip and be a part of
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hich the scratch garrison of Rome's Praenestine allies had been forced to abandon the previous year. In the course of the siege, the Campanian inhabitants attempted to abandon the city and flee to Capua, apparently under a safe-conduct, whether formal or informal. Marcellus, however massacred a number of them, the survivors fleeing to co-commander Quintus Fabius for protection.
In Sicily, Marcellus set about recovering those cities that had broken from Rome, and securing those that were wavering. The process was complicated by the chaos within Syracuse. Pro-Carthagenian mercenary generals, acting on their own, attacked several Roman garrisons, and while their actions were undertaken without any authority from the city to do so, Syracuse its political paralysis it was unable to disavow them. A more un-Roman state of affairs could hardly be imagined, and Marcellus was not the man to deal with it with restraint or imagination.
Marcellus' diplomatic failures were handily exploited by the mercenary generals. When Marcellus forced a couple of them out of the city of Leontini, they successfully spread the rumor that the recapture of Leontini had been accompanied by a general massacre of its population. This rumor was evid
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Some common words found in the essay are:
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Approximate Word count = 6345
Approximate Pages = 25 (250 words per page)
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