Hannibal's Strategy

It is difficult to know for certain whether the the division between a pro-Roman aristocracy and pro-Hannibal commonalty is as simple as Livy portrays it, or whether he is indulging "as usual" in his characteristic anti-populism. It is true that the Roman political order, at home and as supported and enforced among their allies, was consistantly oligarchic, and it was the non-oligarchs who might see most to gain in the overturning of that order. Events recounted below suggest, however, that the actual divisions in Nola were somewhat more complex, and the same was very probably true in other cities as well.

In any case, the Nolan senate sent to Rome to ask for support, and got it in the form of a Roman detachment under the praetor Mercellus Claudius, who reached the city after a roundabout march through the mountains in order to avoid an encounter wi

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ch they could fall back in order to avoid direct confrontation with his army. Hannibal's means of dealing with these potential Roman bases varied. In the cases of the weakest cities, such as Nucera and Acerrae, a threatening move proved sufficient; the towns were abandoned by their inhabitants. In the case of Nola, Hannibal attempted to combine a military assault with political support from disaffected factions within the town; the attempt failed when the political support did not materialize. A siege of such a well-defended city would cost too much in time and resources, and Hannibal had to leave it in Roman hands. Petelia, pro-Roman but without access to direct Roman support, he besieged (presumably with a limited detachment of his forces) and eventually it capitulated with Roman approval. Casilinum, with its scratch garrison of Praenestines, Hannibal was also compelled to besiege, eventually allowing the Praenestines to withdraw on payment of a Roman ransom for them. As well as attempting to clear out Roman strong points, Hannibal had also to deal with allies whose own military inefficiency created distractions for him. In some cases, such as that of the Hirpini and Samnites, the problem was unavoidable. However much
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Approximate Pages = 31 (250 words per page)

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