GNA of 1986 and Jointness
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This paper will discuss the effect the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act (GNA) of 1986 had on the developing concept of jointness. Jointness refers to the ability of the Services and the various defense agencies to plan and operate in a unified fashion. Although jointness has been an ideal of military planning and operations from time immemorial, it was lacking in the United States military throughout most of the Cold War. Between 1947, when the Defense Department was created, and 1986, when the GNA was enacted, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was weak in power. The effect of this weakness on jointness was exacerbated by the fact that the individual Services retained considerable autonomy to develop war plans, train and equip forces, and allocate resources according to their own parochial interests. As a result, spending by the Services tended to be unbalanced, too much emphasis was placed upon annual budgeting at the expense of other important activities, and the Services focused too much upon their own interests and competing with each other (Art, 1992, pp. 2-4).The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was enacted as part of an effort to address the problems in the military forces made evident by the Iran Hostage Crisis, the U.S. intervention in Beirut, and the U.S. invasion of Grenada. The Iran Hostage Crisis had illustrated the inability of the military to adequately respond to new types of situations
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equired military capabilities and ensuring that these capabilities enjoy efficient provision. The process begins with the identification of requirements by the CINCs; these requirements are then submitted to the CJCS, who analyzes them at the national level, assesses which of the proposed programs efficiently satisfies the CINCs' requirements, and then submits his recommendations to the National Command Authorities (NCA). One criticism of this part of the GNA is that it does not work as designed. The CINCs' requirements are submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation in the form of Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs). The requirements are then evaluated by either the OSD or the Joint Chiefs without reference to any type of overall strategic plan which might be able to ascribe theor relative significance (Lovelace, 1996, p. 56).
One of the primary purposes of the GNA was to promote the concept of jointness among the Services and within the command structure. One of the most important tools for accomplishing this objective is the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). The JSPS is the primary means by which the CJCS works with the Joint Chiefs and the CINCs to carry out p
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Some common words found in the essay are:
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Approximate Word count = 1738
Approximate Pages = 7 (250 words per page)
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