With the emergence of a new Russia, and the other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), from the collapse of the U.S.S.R., the identification of Russia's national interests has become a complicated question. National interests are subject to change. With the end of the Cold War and the transformation of the world's economic picture since World War II, the basic, stable core of national interests has been significantly modified. After decades of operating as one half of a superpower standoff, and as the proponent of an ideology that set foreign policy in a 'mission' mode, the new Russia lacks the old determinants of its national interest. In addition, the new set of factors that determine national interest run almost completely counter to Russia's old interests. Among Russian leaders who discuss the national interest, there is a tendency to retain parts of the old view of Russia. Thus, for example, Boris Yeltsin's former adviser, Sergei Stankevich, still conceives of Russia as a great power that need not consider the sovereignty of the nations of the CIS sacrosanct, if it believes these states are persecuting the 25 million ethnic Russians who live outside Russia. Clearly, such a conception of Russia's national identity and its interests has an impact on foreign policy. A leader who held Stankevich's views, for example, would be unlikely to place much emphasis on establishing economic and political relations with the CIS nations based on their independence of Russia. Such a thinker would always see the CIS as a group of lesser states dependent on Russian support and subject to Russian interference whenever it was deemed necessary.
As Fukuyama points out, the notion of a core of stable national interests has changed over time. Geopolitical factors that were believed to determine such a set of interests for nations still remain important to some degree. As Fukuyama notes, for example, geography has consi...