Crisis Management in Cuban Missle Crisis
This is an excerpt from the paper...
This research examines the crisis management practiced by the Kennedy Administration during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. While the emphasis in this research is on the Adminis tration's crisis management, it is also necessary to consider the issue of Soviet missiles in Cuba for reasons other than the obvious: the issue created the situation wherein crisis manage ment was required. Among some analysts and historians, how ever, there are doubts that the presence of the Soviet missiles in Cuba increased significantly the Soviet threat to United States (US) national security (FitzSimmons, 1969; Walton, 1972). Many of these analysts and historians tend to think that the Kennedy Administration felt compelled to treat the issue as a crisis, and to appear, at least to come out of it a winner, because of the severe loss of credibility suffered by the Administration both domestically and internationally as a consequence of the Bay of Pigs fiasco (Medland, 1988). Thus, the management of the crisis involving Soviet missiles in Cuba must be examined both narrowly in the context of the missile issue per se, and more broadly with respect to both (1) the range of international issues in which the Kennedy Administra tion was involved, and (2) domestic political imperatives faced by the Administration in the fall of 1962.First and foremost was the issue of Soviet missiles in Cuba. On Monday, 15 October, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) ph
. . .
a.
6. The Congo: Through United Nations (UN) action, the US was attempting to restore stability to the Congo (Pachter, 1963). Once again, the intent of the US action was to thwart Soviet plans.
7. Turkey. With respect to Turkey, the Soviets wanted the Americans to abandon their Strategic Air Command (SAC) bases in that country (Detzer, 1979). From the Soviet perspec tive, the American bases in Turkey were analogous to Soviet missiles in Cuba.
5
In one sense, the Kennedy Administration felt that, should it appear to defer to the Soviets in the Cuban missile crisis, its international standing would suffer, and its hand would be weakened with respect to all of the international issues with which it was dealing (Pachter, 1963). In another sense, the Administration was intent on resisting, at least formally, any linkage of the various issues involving the Americans and the Soviets, wherein Allied or American prerogatives could be bargained away (Detzer, 1979). The Americans were particularly concerned with any attempts to link the Cuban missile issue with either Allied prerogatives in Berlin, or the presence of American bases in Turkey (Detzer, 1979).
THE AMERICAN PLAYERS ANDTHEIR POSITIONS
Within the Kennedy Administrat
. . .
Some common words found in the essay are:
Hall Simons, President Kennedy, Kennedy Administration, Berlin Turkish, DECISIONS Cuban, Missile Crisis, Aviation Week, Democratic Party, pachter 1963, Agency CIA, Medium range Soviet, cuban missile, missile crisis, cuban missile crisis, soviet missiles, missiles cuba, coercive diplomacy, soviet missiles cuba, crisis management, detzer 1979, kennedy administration, hall simons, george hall simons, hall simons 1971, missile crisis 1962,
Approximate Word count = 2160
Approximate Pages = 9 (250 words per page)
More Essays on Crisis Management in Cuban Missle Crisis
|
Customer Service
to Over
32,000 Professionally Written Papers!!!
