EFFECTS OF GERMAN WOLFPACKS ON WORLD WAR II
This research paper examines the effects of the principal tactical innovation of the German U-Boat service in World War II. The wolfpacks enabled the U-boats to apply sudden and concentrated force with maximum impact against Allied merchantmen in many theaters of war, especially in the vital Atlantic Ocean shipping lanes between North America and Great Britain. Successive U-boat campaigns wreaked havoc on Allied shipping during the first four years of the war, nearly severing the North Atlantic lifeline twice, in early 1941 and again in the spring of 1943. However, this effort ultimately failed because German war aims, especially after 1941, outstripped Germany's resources and capabilities which could not support the effort required to make the U-boats a decisive weapon of war. By May of 1943, the quantitative and qualitative superiority of Anglo-American anti-submarine countermeasures had largely negated the tactical advantages of the wolfpacks resulting in the eventual defeat of the U-boats.
Strength. The German U-Boat (Unter-See-Boot) service entered World War II substantially understrength; it had only 57 U-boats. As late as February 1941, the number of U-boats available for ocean operations did not exceed 22 (Terraine 207). According to Hezlet, "German U-boats were quite unready for war with Great Britain in 1939" (162).
A force of only 12 small U-boats were on the drawing boards when Adolf Hitler came to power in 1933. U-boat construction was given low priority in his rearmament plans. Under the 1935 Anglo-German Naval Agreement, Germany was permitted to build U-boats up to 45 percent of the size of the British submarine fleet, and, after giving notice, up to 100 percent. In May, 1938, Hitler decided to accelerate the U-boat building program, but most resources were allocated to the construction of surface ships. In 1939, Karl Donitz, head of the U-boat service since 1935, a...