Re: Jason Mays (challenge for cause)
The trial court erred by denying the cause challenge brought by Mays’ attorney.
Federal law governs challenges for cause not state law. In Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir.), (1998), the Court maintained “The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants a verdict by impartial, indifferent jurors.” Juror #6, Louise Maynard, said she “despises drug dealers” because of losing a cousin to drug use. The trial court violated Mays’ right to a fair trial by an impartial jury when it denied May’s cause challenge to Juror #6. Precedent for this interpretation comes in Berry Kessler v. State of Florida, 852 So. 2d (Fla. 1991)). Although Juror #6 stated that she could presume Mays innocent, it is unrealistic to believe she could completely set aside the very prejudicial and personal attitudes she expressed and base her verdict entirely on the evidence presented at trial and the court’s instructions on the law.
In United States v. Toomey, 764 F.2d 678, 683 (9th Cir. 1985) the Court rules that “A defendant is entitled to voir dire that fairly and adequately probes a juror’s qualifications.” The court erred in deny cause challenge lacking a fair and adequate probe of Juror #6. While the decision to strike a prospective juror for cause “upon a suggestion of impartiality is within the sound discretion of the trial judge”, the trial judge’s discretion in this case was not sound, United States v. Taylor, 554 F.2d 200, 202 (5th Cir. 1977). The Court determined that Juror #6 could remain fair and impartial, but his discretion was not sound based on United States v. Nell, 526 F.2d 1223. 1229 & n.8 (5th Cir. 1976). In U.S. v. Nell it was determined that when a prospective juror reveals actual bias, or when bias is implied because the juror has some special relationship to a party, the court must dismiss the prospective juror for cause.
In United States v. Mar...