This essay endorses the method of statutory interpretation espoused by Laurence Tribe in Justice Antonin's Scalia's book, A Matter of Interpretation. Tribe's approach is a much closer approximation to current judicial practice in the United States, which although far from perfect, is superior to the method of statutory interpretation advocated by Scalia.
Summary of Scalia's Views. In his book, Scalia discusses both methods of statutory and constitutional interpretation, the latter being a special subspecies of the former. With some exceptions, Scalia believes in giving laws the meaning that their words import and in case of ambiguity, largely confining a judge's recourse to the surrounding circumstances which explain what was intended by the law. He would not, however, give any weight to legislative intent, except in helping to understand what the words in the law mean. In constitutional cases, the only intent he deems relevant is the intent of the authors of a law at the time it was enacted, such as that of the framers in 1787-1790. Departure from textualism, what Scalia calls his philosophy, has in Scalia's view produced judgemade law, the imposition by judges in the cases they decide of their personal or subjective views of what the law ought to be and their value judgments. The result is anti-democratic, has led to the discovery by the courts of rights which were never intended by the law (or Constitution's) original draftsmen and overall to a diminution of public respect for the courts and of individual rights generally.
Tribe's Comments. Neither Tribe nor any other rational person for that matter can disagree with Scalia that where the words of a statute or other law provide clear meaning, there is no need to refer to other sources in interpreting it. However, laws often, as drafted, do not convey a clear and unambiguous meaning and in other cases, such as when terms such as fair, due process, equal protection, free spee...