Mao Tse-tung's Military Thought
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Mao Tse-tung was one of the most important military as well as political figures of the twentieth century. His doctrine of protracted guerilla revolutionary war had a major influence on the history of the second half of the twentieth century, and his military doctrines were successfully employed by the North Vietnamese to stymie the United States during the Vietnam war. Yet--in contrast to most famous generals--his military career is not one of dramatic victories won in the field. Indeed, his most famous single military exploit is a retreat, the Long March. In order to understand the nature and significance of Mao's military thought, we must understand both the political context of that thought and the military context in which Mao operated. In spite of the famous dictum of Clausewitz that war is an extension of policy, the study of war and of politics have been largely isolated from one another in the Western world. Political philosophers paid little attention to war, and military theorists paid little attention to broader political issues. A striking exception to this pattern of divorce is Machiavelli, whose military thought was closely integrated with his broader political philosophy. To Mao, as to Machiavelli, war and politics were a continuum, not isolated compartments. Mao was perhaps forced to this understanding by circumstances. The Chinese Communist Party originally pursued an urban insurrectionary strategy, in keeping with orthodox Marxist-Len
. . .
ao's military writing is very suggestive of Sun Tzu:
Oppose fixed battle lines and positional warfare, and
favor fluid battle lines and mobile warfare.
Oppose fighting merely to rout the enemy, and uphold
fighting to annihilate the enemy.
Oppose the strategy of striking with two "fists" in
two directions at the same time [i.e., dispersing
one's forces, and uphold the strategy of striking
with one "fist" in one direction at one time.
Oppose bandit ways, and uphold strict political discipline.
Oppose the policy of isolation, and affirm the policy of
winning over all possible allies.
Except for the troops engaged in frontal defense against
the enemy, our forces will be switched in large numbers
to the enemy's rear in comparatively dispersed dis-
positions, and, basing themselves on all areas not
actually occupied by the enemy and co-ordinating with
the people's local armed forces, they will launch
extensive, fierce guerilla warfare against enemy-
occupied areas, keeping the enemy on the move as far
as possible in order to destroy him in mobile warfare.
On the role of retreat as a positive action in warfare, Mao held that the Communist army should retreat until the following conditions were met, conditio
. . .
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Approximate Word count = 6671
Approximate Pages = 27 (250 words per page)
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