Book I of Aristotle's Ethics
This is an excerpt from the paper...
The purpose of this research is to examine Book I of Aristotle's Ethics. The plan of the research will be to set forth in general terms Aristotle's ethical theory, and then to discuss the goals and achievements of the Ethics in respect of the main arguments made in the work, especially relative to analyses of the highest achievable good and the aim of happiness as functions of ethics and virtue. Aristotle's theory of ethics is that it is one of the practical sciences, which is to say that ethics is something that has application to real life, beyond the merely theoretical. Ethics therefore involves action as well as a discussion about contingent ethical decisions. Just as ethics involves something beyond theory, any actions undertaken have a practical purpose beyond their mere ethical nature. Actions on this view point in the direction of what eventually come to be called goods. "It makes no difference," Aristotle says, "whether the ends of the actions are the activities themselves or something apart from them" (Aristotle, 1976, p. 63). In this regard, Ackrill notes that Aristotle's making certain actions have relevance to results that may be connected to the actions but that extend beyond such actions implies that the results or consequences of the actions are of paramount. Success or failure of an action, he says, "depends on the outcome, and that is the point" (Ackrill, 1980, p. 19). Actions have consequences, and that means that the moral quality attached to pro
. . .
hat the universal good can be conceptualized in terms of the Theory of Forms. Aristotle says that "good is not a common characteristic corresponding to one Ideal" (I.vi.71), which he proves by asserting that such an idea is divorced from the conception of ethics as a practical science. If a good is practical, it cannot be ideal, for every situation in which a good action becomes conceivable is unique. And if a good is unique in its own right, it is not ideal in the Platonic sense. As Aristotle puts it, "even if the goodness that is predicated in common [i.e., universally] is some one thing or has a separate existence of its own, clearly it cannot be realized in action or acquired by man" (I.vi.72). The Idea of the Good in the Platonic sense can simply not be entirely reconciled with Aristotle's insistence that ethics is a practical science. For practical sciences by their very makeup, "though aiming at some good and seeking to supply its deficiency, neglect knowledge of it" (I.vi.72). In other words, good must be attached to something palpable or experiential, and this is not possible if the good is conceived of only in the abstract. The emphasis of the Platonic Idea of the Good is therefore inappropriate, even though Aristo
. . .
Some common words found in the essay are:
Nicomachean Ethics, Platonist Eudoxos, Nevertheless Aristotle's, Elsewhere Hardie, Aristotle's Ethics, Indeed Chapter, Platonic Idea, EN I2, Book Aristotle, Aristotle's Book, nicomachean ethics, practical science, chapter 7, hardie 1980, roche 1992, function argument, chapter 7 aristotle, material account, formal account, 7 aristotle, soul accordance, activity soul accordance, soul accordance virtue, ethics practical science, roche 1992 51,
Approximate Word count = 6343
Approximate Pages = 25 (250 words per page)
More Essays on Book I of Aristotle Ethics
|