Hannibal's Offensive Policy & Roman Campaign

It was further argued that the latter was evidently Hannibal's option of preference, since after Cannae, when the Roman field armies were effectively destroyed and the way to Rome lay open, Hannibal chose instead to ignore Rome and concentrate his efforts on the Italian allies. It should be emphasized again that the two strategies were not mutually exclusive; a political attack on the alliance system might be preliminary to a subsequent attack directly on Rome. Nevertheless, at the moment of maximum opportunity, the alliance-fragmenting option is the one Hannibal chose.

The questions thus arise of what precisely that option entailed, and why Hannibal believed it would be more productive than a direct assault on Rome. In a negative sense the answer to the latter is clear enough. A siege would be long and difficult, a point that must have been underlined for Hannibal by his experience in the eight-month effort of taking Saguntum.

However, as an argument against a direct-assault strategy, the foreseeable difficulties of a si

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n an age without radio broadcasts or planes to drop leaflets. Ancient populist movements were usually led by local dissident aristocrats, and it would have been difficult, from a distance, to identify and make contact with potential dissident leaders. Moreover, Hannibal's political strategy relied upon allies voluntarily breaking from Rome--and the allied cities were themselves dominated by oligarchies. Even members of local "out" factions would for the most part be concerned with their own status and estates; if Hannibal identified his cause with social revolution he might only succeed in driving the oligarchic class throughout Italy into common cause with Rome. A social-revolutionary strategy, while potentially powerful, was thus both difficult to implement and highly risky. Given the apparently good chance of breaking up the Roman alliance system without resorting to such a strategy, there was little reason for him to consider it. All of this having been said, the Roman system proved more resilient than Hannibal must have anticipated. Even after repeated hammer blows against Roman armies, most of the allies held firm. Their gates remained closed to Hannibal's army, and--even costlier in the long run--they continued to
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Approximate Word count = 6976
Approximate Pages = 28 (250 words per page)

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