Von Clausewitz' On American Military Thought This paper will briefly discuss the most

This paper discusses the most important elements of Carl von Clausewitz' seminal work, On War. The paper will focus upon his ideas concerning the proper relationship between policy and military strategy, as well as on his ideas concerning "real war," the "paradoxical trinity" of war, friction, and the "fog of war." The paper will then discuss the similarities between Clausewitz, Helmuth von Moltke, and Sun Tzu. The paper will conclude by briefly discussing the influence of Clausewitz on modern American military thought.

Clausewitz' most famous pronouncements was that war is the "continuation of policy by other means" (Clausewitz, 1984, p. 87). By this, he meant that war is inextricably tied to policy, although military aims are distinct from political objects. The political aims are the original motives for any war. Warfare is undertaken in order to achieve these political aims, such as the conquest of a territory intended to be kept or to be used as a bargaining chip in negotiations. Thus, the conduct of any war must be in harmony with the political aims which created it (Clausewitz, 1984, pp. 78-88).

Clausewitz recognized that the generals entrusted with conducting a particular war may feel that the political objectives interfere with the military aims: the defeat of the enemy. Wars which are general in nature, in which the motives are powerful and inspiring, do not usually involve much conflict between the political and military aims. Limited wars, on the oth

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volve states of unequal strength. Thus, weaker states may seek peace not only because they lack the ability to carry on the struggle, but also because victory is improbable or it would come only at an unacceptable cost (Clausewitz, 1984, p. 91). States engage in war not strictly out of inherent necessity. The less necessary a war is to one state, the more likely that state will seek peace short of disarming its enemy. And if that state's motivations for going to war are relatively slight, then it may seek peace at the slightest probability of defeat. Moreover, if that state's enemy believes that its opponent will seek peace at the slightest provocation, then it will likely concentrate its efforts upon bringing about that provocation. Such efforts are less costly than trying to inflict total defeat on the first state (Clausewitz, 1984, p. 91). The decision to make peace is also affected by the political objectives of each combatant. The value of these objectives will determine the amount of sacrifice each side is willing to endure. Once the sacrifices entailed by war exceed the value of the political objectives for going to war, then a state must seek peace or risk losing sight of its original objectives (Clausewitz, 1984,

Category: Government - V