Hannibal's Victory at Cannae & Continued War Strategy
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A complex problem was faced by Hannibal himself. He needed to decide how to exploit the fruits of victory, and--barring a total Roman political collapse, on which Hannibal could not count--the decisions he made would shape the future course of the war. The main action at Cannae was barely concluded, and mopping-up operations on the battlefield perhaps still going forward, when there occurred one of the most famous reported exchanges of the Second Roman War. According to Livy, Hannibal's officers crowded around him with congratulations on his victory. The others all advised him, now that he had brought so great a war to a conclusion, to repose himself and to allow his weary soldiers to repose for the remainder of that day and the following night. But Maharbal, the commander of the cavalry, held that no time should be lost. "Nay," he cried, "that you may realize what has been accomplished by this battle, in five days you shall banquet in the Capitol! Follow after; I will precede you with the cavalry, that the Romans may know that you are there before they know that you are coming!" To Hannibal the idea was too joyous and too vast for his mind at once to grasp it. And so, while praising Maharbal's goodwill, he declared that he must have time to deliberate regarding his advice. Then said Maharbal, "In very truth the gods bestow not on the same man all their gifts; you know how to gain a victory, Hannibal: you know not how to use one."
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were placed in ambush positions. A body of Neapolitan cavalry sallied out against the visible Numidians, and were duly ambushed by the rest. This operation sounds like an exercise in intimidation tactics; if the Neapolitans were not swayed over by the initial display of plunder, they might be by the defeat of their cavalry. The Neapolitans were not intimidated, however; the gates remained closed. Hannibal declined to attempt a siege, "deterred by the sight of walls such as by no means invited an attacker." More probably he had no wish to become bogged down in a siege; having rejected that option against Rome, he certainly had no reason to attempt it against a purely secondary objective such as Neapolis.
The failure to take Neapolis and thus secure a seaport was certainly a setback. How serious it was in Hannibal's own eyes is uncertain; indeed even in hindsight it is not certain how grave a setback it was. Possession of a seaport would open the possibility of reinforcement from Carthage, but actually making good on that possibility was not within Hannibal's power. For that, he was dependent entirely on Carthagenian readiness to take energetic action at sea--and nothing in the course of the war to date would give either
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Some common words found in the essay are:
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Approximate Word count = 6703
Approximate Pages = 27 (250 words per page)
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