William B. Quandt, in Peace Process, uses four theories to try to explain U.S. policy in the Middle East. He is convincing in arguing both that the policy of the U.S. toward the Arab-Israeli conflict has been generally consistent, and that this policy has been grounded in the "view of conflict" theory. This means that the policy has been primarily defined and exercised according to how the conflict is viewed by the President and his primary aides in the decision making process.
Quandt argues that "the basic American position adopted in 1967 has remained remarkably consistent" (Quandt 5). To bolster this claim, he cites a number of U.S. stands which have indeed remained central to American policy since 1967. That policy has been generally pro-Israeli, but not without reservations. For example, U.S. policy recognizes that "Israel should not be required to relinquish territories captured in 1967 without a quid pro quo from the Arab parties involving peace, security and recognition" (Quandt 5-6). Having made this claim for consistency, Quandt lists the four alternative theories which might explain such consistency. The three theories which Quandt rejects as central to U.S. policy in the Middle East, are the strategic-rational, the bureaucratic politics and domestic politics approaches. The strategic-rational model is rejected by Quandt because "anyone who has spent time in government will testify that policymaking is anything but orderly and rational" (Quandt 7). The bureaucratic politics model is rejected because it relies on a conspiracy among insiders which could not have been sustained through the decades. The domestic politics model is rejected because Quandt feels there is "little evidence" that the oil (Arab) or pro-Israeli lobbies are powerful enough to shape U.S. policy consistently for two-and-a-half decades. This leaves the view of conflict approach, which Quandt endorses. He believes that the generally consistent policy of t...