LINCOLN AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF IN THE EAST

This research paper discusses and assesses the impact of President Abraham Lincoln's military decisions in the East on the outcome of the Civil War. After a shaky beginning, Lincoln became an effective commander in chief and politico-military leader of the Union with respect to its campaigns in the East. Lincoln was handicapped during the first three years of the war in the East by a serious command problem which was not finally solved until 1864 with the appointment of Ulysses Grant to command all Union forces, including those in the East, but nevertheless his military decisions gradually moved into alignment with a more sensible military strategy and made a major contribution to the ultimate defeat of the Confederacy.

Lincoln made some sound military decisions with respect to the war in the East during the first two and a half years of the conflict and some poor ones. He came to office with virtually no experience with military matters, except for 40 days service in the Blackhawk War, nor in administration. Davis says, however, that he was "a man of unyielding iron resolve" (The Deep Waters 51). In the first three months of the war, Catton said that he "saved the Union" by making strong decisions on his own and without Congressional assent (33). He decided that the firing on Fort Sumter was an act of war and announced his determination to preserve the Union. He called up the first militias and announced a naval blockade o

. . .
n's insistence on removing a portion of his army to defend Washington. Catton says that decision was sound because "the one way [the North] was sure to lose the war quickly was to lose the capital" (22). McClellan had sufficient forces to win in the peninsula. His basic problem was his lack of aggressiveness on the offense, what Hattaway and Archer termed his "excessive caution and tendency to exaggerate difficulties" (173). Catton says that he "had practically all of the virtues necessary in a war leader-except one-he did not like to fight" (87). Some historians have been extremely unkind to McClellan. His biographer Sears said that he "was not a real general . . . a vain and unstable man, with considerable military knowledge, who sat a horse well and wanted to be President" (479). This overlooks his significant defensive victories in the late stages of the Peninsula campaign and at the bloody Battle of Antietam in September, 1962 where he stopped cold Lee's first incursion into the North. After McClellan failed in Lincoln's judgment to pursue and destroy the defeated foe, Lincoln finally fired him for good in November, 1862, telling a friend that McClellan "has got the 'slows'" (Davis, The Deep Waters 273). During this period,
. . .

Some common words found in the essay are:
Hattaway Archer, Lincoln Grant, Virginia Grant, North South, Potomac McClellan, Ulysses Grant, Conclusion Lincoln's, According Catton, Deep Waters, Anaconda Plan, ny doubleday, city ny, hattaway archer, garden city, garden city ny, city ny doubleday, military decisions, army potomac, deep waters, confederacy lost, lost ed gabor, july 1862, army northern virginia, naval blockade, ny doubleday 1992,
Approximate Word count = 1890
Approximate Pages = 8 (250 words per page)

More Essays on LINCOLN AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF IN THE EAST