This research examines the concept of coercive diplomacy as developed by Alexander George and William Simons in their seminal work, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (1994). The concept of coercive diplomacy will first be defined, followed by an analysis of the several different factors which affect the outcome of such a strategy. Finally, some of the most important factors will be highlighted that contributed to the successful conclusion of diplomatic actions in Laos and Cuba.
Coercive diplomacy is defined as a defensive diplomatic strategy that is employed in the international arena to deal with the efforts of an adversary to change a status quo situation in his own favor. Coercive diplomacy is distinct from deterrence theory in that coercive diplomacy is a response to a hostile action already taken while deterrence attempts to prevent a hostile action. Coercive diplomacy is also distinct from normal forms of diplomacy in that the former implies a coercive element of perceived or actual threats while normal diplomacy consists of international negotiations minus any coercive component.
There are three major types of coercive diplomacy defined by different objectives. The first (Type A) is the use of a mix of threats and diplomatic channels to persuade an opponent to stop short of the final objectives of a hostile action. The second (Type B) is the use of coercive and diplomatic measures to persuade an opponent to reverse the gains of a hostile action. And the last and most dramatic (Type C) is the employment of coercive diplomacy to fundamentally restructure the form of government within an adversarial nation. Obviously, the more ambitious the goal of the nation employing coercive diplomacy, the greater the risk that it entails.
Coercive diplomacy relies on at least the threat of military action, but it is nevertheless an alternative to the outright use of force. It seeks to persuade an opponent to cease hostile actions pri...