AMERICAN STATECRAFT AND THE PERSIAN GULF WAR
This paper analyzes the uses made by the United States of various tools of international statecraft during the period leading up to, during and immediately after the Persian Gulf War. In dealing with the threat posed by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the United States had as options deterrence, diplomacy and the use of military force. It had available to it different crisis management techniques and, once war ensued, it had to choose how to terminate the fighting. The thesis of this paper is that the United States, after a fumbling beginning, made effective use of all these tools; however, certain unique features were present in this situation which suggest that not all that worked in the Persian Gulf war is likely to serve as a guide for the resolution of other crises.
The United States ultimately decided to apply overwhelming military power to attain its objectives in the Persian Gulf War. It succeeded in less than eight months in defeating Iraq's not inconsiderable military machine. As a result of the war, Stiles said that "Saddam Hussein, while still in power, is seriously constrained and no longer represents a threat to the region" (149). Notwithstanding this accomplishment, some critics have argued that the allies should have "gone on to Baghdad" and finished off Saddam Hussein once and for all. Others, including Stiles, concluded that "the use of force was in fact the consequence of failed diplomacy and misread history" (151). What light do the lessons of history, as set forth in analysis of Craig and George in their book, shed on these subjects?
Probably only Saddam Hussein could say just why he chose to invade Kuwait when he did. There were various matters in dispute between the two countries. According to Stiles, the principal bone of contention was Kuwait's refusal to forgive Iraq's massive war debt to it arising out of the Iran Iraq war (139). ...