Sex stereotyping and sexual discrimination are treated on a very inconsistent basis under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It is not uncommon, for example, for a female attorney to be denied promotion in a law firm because her behavior "lacks social graces," and for the same law firm to yet deny a male attorney a promotion because the senior partners thought him "too soft." Finally, a third attorney could be denied promotion for the simple reason that he is homosexual.
The law today views these three hypothetical examples of sexual discrimination very differently. The first female attorney generally will be protected by Title VII, while the same may be argued for the second male attorney for comparable reasons, although no such case has ever been tested in the courts. Meanwhile, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation clearly has not been seen as in violation of Title VII by the courts.
This research examines some of the history of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and charts how the federal law has been defined by the courts. The basis for distinguishing the application of Title VII between sexual stereotypes and sexual orientation will also be scrutinized.
Title VII was added to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by Representative Howard Smith of Virginia as a political tactic intended to defeat the amendment. Title VII provides, in part, that:
"(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his (sic) compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. . . ." [42 U.S.C., 2000e-2 (1988)].
The original version of the amendment did not include the category of sex as a basis for unlawful discrimination. Records of congressional hearings on Title VII show that sex dis...