Mental illness among criminal offenders has been subject to special attention for centuries and has, of late, become a locus for debate among social scientists, members of the judiciary and the bar, and in political circles (Linhorst & Dinks-Linhorst, 1999). In Roman and English law, and later in the law of the United States, there is a belief that persons who commit crimes as a consequence of mental illness should not be held criminally responsible because they lack the criminal intent to commit the acts. This belief informs the core of the so-called "insanity defense" in the United States, a plea option that allows a defendant to seek acquittal for the alleged criminal defense by reason of insanity (temporary or otherwise).
If found not guilty by reason of insanity, most states automatically hospitalize the person or evaluate the need for hospitalization under criteria that are more likely to result in this disposition than civil commitment (Linhorst & Dinks- Linhorst, 1999). As Robinson (1993) has pointed out, the issue is complicated by the fact that at present, criminal offenders acquitted due to insanity can be released when they have regained their sanity but are still considered dangerous. Alternatively, when efforts are made to retain such offenders in institutional settings, the courts find that Due Process has been violated, as was the case in the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Fouca v. Louisiana (Robinson, 1993). At issue, therefore, is whether or not society's interests would best be served by expanding civil commitment laws to include extended commitment due to dangerousness. Similarly, as Linhorst and Dinks-Linhorst (1999) have commented, while the insanity defense is rarely used (with recent studies indicating that fewer than one percent of defendants charged with felonies offering this defense), the question of whether mentally ill individuals should be subject to civil commitment following an acquittal (and t...