The so-called "Cuban Missile Crisis" was actually a test of strength between the USSR and the US. For President Kennedy and his advisers, it was the need to not merely avoid nuclear war, but to safeguard the old principle of the Monroe Doctrine- no foreign interference within the Western hemisphere. Whether Khrushchev ever really intended to use the missiles, or whether it was a public relations ploy on his part, to capitalize on some sort of American weakness, or unwillingness for a serious confrontation is hearsay, at best. "Leading Sovietologists have concluded that the introduction of strategic missiles into Cuba was motivated chiefly by the Soviet leaders' desire to overcomeathe existing margin of US strategic superiority" (Harrison 1999 374). However, the important relationship to management decision-making points out the advantages of having a series of voices and opinions of Kennedy advisors, all working for a common goal: to reduce the threat and alleviate the political as well as military dangers. Now, to discuss the management strategies employed during the thirteen days of the crisis:
Unlike what we know about George W. Bush, John F. Kennedy was a hands-on leader. He gathered experts around him- even those with varying opinions. He would listen, but the final decision was his to make. And he did so, only after gathering intelligence, discussing it with the people he trusted, and coming to a consensus. According to Table 7.1, it is Group structure- "Specialists with a coordinator (leader)" (Harrison 234).
At the same time, there had to be group expertise. The reason is obvious: "It was important that the decision not result in a permanent rupture of relations with the Soviet Union" (Harrison 378). It had to be a consensus before taking action, but it required experts in diplomacy as well as military options, people with the power to influence not only American public opinion, but also to gather allies in...