I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING VERDICT BECAUSE NOT ALL OF THE DEFENDANTS' COMMUNICATIONS WERE ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED.
A. The defendant William Bailey's motion for JNOV was improperly granted because some of his communications were not absolutely privileged as statements made during the course of, or relevant to, a quasi-judicial proceeding.
The Washington Supreme Court has held that "quasi-judicial immunity attaches to persons or entities who perform functions that are so comparable to those performed by judges that it is felt that they should share the judges' absolute immunity while carrying out those functions. Quasi-judicial immunity is absolute." Lutheran Day Care v. Snohomish County, 119 Wash.2d 91, 829 P.2d 746, 749 (1992). Although there is no exact definition of a quasi-judicial proceeding, some general guidelines have been established. The official body conducting the proceeding must typically be able to exercise judgment and discretion, hear and determine or ascertain facts and decide, make binding orders and judgments, affect the personal or property rights of private persons, examine witnesses and hear litigation of the issues on a hearing, and enforce decisions or impose penalties. Thomas v. Petrulis, 125 Ill. App.3d 415, 419-20, 465 N.E.2d 1059 (1984). The powers granted to the Superintendent of Public Instruction tend to bring a teacher decertification proceeding within the definition of a quasi-judicial proceeding. Wash. Rev. Code ( 28A.410.095 (1993).
The quasi-judicial nature of a proceeding is also determined by the safeguards provided to protect against an abuse of absolute privilege. The Washington Supreme Court has ruled that an absolute privilege can only be allowed in "situations in which authorities have the power to discipline as well as strike from the record statements which exceed the bounds of permissible conduct." Twelker v. Shann...