Lebow's Theory of War The purpose of this rese

To understand what Lebow takes to be the insufficiency of traditional rational deterrence theory, it is useful to understand what such theory is. Another term for rational deterrence, which is to say the reasoned analysis of international confrontation that leads to a determination on the part of one nation-state to wage war in order to prevent a major loss in war to another nation state, is preventive war. In other words, one state that is at a military advantage but that perceives a future military threat to itself from another state would precipitate a war against the second state in order to forestall (i.e., deter) the second's military equivalence or advantage in a presumed future war. The decision to engage in war, on this view, is taken based on a rational analysis of the target state's military capabilities and the ability of the original state to deter an even worse war in the future.

Lebow cites three cases--Germany in the years prior to 1914, the US vis-a-vis the USSR in the years between the end of World War II and the Cuban Missile Crisis, an

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itarily stronger than Russia but refrained from acting. According to the rational deterrence theory, Germany should have moved because of "the calculus of decision as a comparison of cost and gain, with the rational policymaker moved to adopt the initiative in question to the extent that the gains outweigh the costs" (155). But this did not happen, and for nonrational reasons. Similarly the case in the earliest years of the Cold War, when the US had a significant nuclear advantage over the USSR. Despite the Cold War rhetoric and what could be described as a protracted policy of anticommunist fearmongering about Soviet nuclear capabilities, throughout the 1950s, however, there was no nuclear engagement. The reasons go to the connection between absolute costs and the psychology of leaders. Lebow continues, As a general rule it may be that the more costly any contemplated foreign policy venture is judged to be, the more important absolute versus relative cost becomes in the minds of policymakers. If so, this calls into question the utility of a cost-gain calculus in predicting or explaining decisions with regard to the use of strategic nuclear weapons (157). Lebow implies a connection between traditional "rational" political/mili
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Some common words found in the essay are:
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Approximate Word count = 1288
Approximate Pages = 5 (250 words per page)