The purpose of this research is to examine the case studies used by Richard N. Lebow to revise the rational deterrence theory of war. The plan of the research will be to set forth the main idea behind the theory and then to discuss Lebow's case-history supports for the argument that it may be inadequate to explaining why, in a context of rational decisions about whether to wage war, war has been and may be avoided.
To understand what Lebow takes to be the insufficiency of traditional rational deterrence theory, it is useful to understand what such theory is. Another term for rational deterrence, which is to say the reasoned analysis of international confrontation that leads to a determination on the part of one nation-state to wage war in order to prevent a major loss in war to another nation state, is preventive war. In other words, one state that is at a military advantage but that perceives a future military threat to itself from another state would precipitate a war against the second state in order to forestall (i.e., deter) the second's military equivalence or advantage in a presumed future war. The decision to engage in war, on this view, is taken based on a rational analysis of the target state's military capabilities and the ability of the original state to deter an even worse war in the future.
Lebow cites three cases--Germany in the years prior to 1914, the US vis-a-vis the USSR in the years between the end of World War II and the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the USSR vis-a-vis the PRC in the years of the Sino-Soviet split--that support the idea that nonmilitary reasons as much as and perhaps more than solely military ones have the effect of delaying or deterring entry into war. In each case cited, Lebow refers to "'a window of opportunity,' a period during which a state possesses a significant military advantage over an adversary" (147). It should be noted that Lebow does not develop the Sino-Soviet case history as exten...