Military Response to L.A. Riots

A. Identification of the Appropriate Military Response to Civil Disturbances Based on Doctrine and Which Organization Should Accomplish This Response. United States armed forces have traditionally been available to provide military assistance to civilian authorities (MACDIS or MACA) in restoring law and order in domestic civil disturbances. However, under Department of Defense (DOD) Directive Number 3025.12, 4 Feb 1994 (1994 Directive) and its 1991 predecessor, the armed forces renders MACDIS only as a last resort where its "use . . . is necessary to prevent the loss of life or wanton destruction of property, or to restore governmental functioning and public order" and when "duly constituted local authorities are unable to control the situation" (sec. 4.2.2.1). Sec. 4.1.3 provides that "the primary responsibility for protecting life and property and maintaining law and order in the civilian community is vested in the State and local governments".

Scheips (n.d.) notes the traditional "need for minimum force whenever federal forces responded to civil unrest" (p. 42). Secs. 4.7.2.1 and 4.7.2.2 of DOD Directive Number 3025.15, 18 February, 1997 (1997 Directive) clarify that the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) must approve authority for any request "involving lethal support" or "for assistance with potential for confrontation with civilians." MACDIS is governed by rules of engagement approved by the DOD General

. . .
. . . insisted on bypassing the county level (LA County Sheriff's Office) and sending requests directly to the CANG" (p. 65). (2) CANG's initial response was slow and somewhat disorganized. Its troops did not arrive in the streets until 17 hours after Wilson's order or not until the evening of April 30. Lacking proper warning by LAPD, CANG loaned out to local agencies key items of riot control equipment such as face shields, riot batons and lock plates for their M-16 rifles. Logistics failures included ammunition shortages and transportation and communications snafus. Training was inadequate and predicated on the mistaken belief that the troops would face only a riot and not "low-intensity conflict (or urban warfare)," (Delk, p. 55). Schnaubelt said training before and during the crisis was based on out of date "crowd control" techniques prescribed in the 1985 Army Field Manual 19-15, Civil Disturbances. Schnaubelt added that "absolutely no one, civilian or military, expected a situation where the National Guard would be needed on the streets in a matter of hours" (p. 62). (3) The federal response was timely. SecDef Richard Cheney put 4,000 Army and Marine troops on alert on April 30. As the violence spread, Wilson asked for
. . .

Some common words found in the essay are:
Los Angeles, National Guard, DOD Directive, Army Marine, LAPD CANG, Webster Report, AO-1 Schnaubelt, CANG Army, Grange Johnson, According Schnaubelt, los angeles, civil disturbances, los angeles riots, angeles riots, law enforcement, national guard, military assistance, 18 usc, 1992 los, command control, 1992 los angeles, military assistance civil, 1994 directive, army field manual, domestic civil disturbances,
Approximate Word count = 1858
Approximate Pages = 7 (250 words per page)

More Essays on Military Response to L.A. Riots