The United States in the 1950s worked to draw the Middle Eastern countries into a broader military scheme that would encompass the region as a whole, but this proved impossible as the Arab world was reluctant to enter into such an arrangement. In some areas in the North, the Soviet menace was ever present, and the United States turned her attention in this direction. The Baghdad Pact of 1955 was part of this effort and united in a military alliance three non-Arab countries (Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan), one Arab country (Iraq), and one Western country (Britain). The U.S. did not formally adhere in part out of fear that it would alienate forever the revolutionary regime in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world, but American civil and military representatives were active on various committees of the Baghdad Pact organization.
While the Baghdad Pact was not very successful in terms of its mission of the defense of the Middle East, it began a period when the United States was exposed to a chain reaction as various political moves deepened the cleavage between itself and the Arab nationalists. For a time, there was a gain in American prestige as Egypt's leader, Nasser, and other Arab nationalists gave gratitude for the American stand on the Suez War. This was dissipated, however, with the endorsement by the U.S. of the principle of freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba and with the policy statement of 1957 that was known as the Eisenhower Doctrine. This was a response to concerns about Communist penetration into the Arab world. The declaration for Russia to keep her hands off was directed mainly at the Arab world, but since the doctrine implied a degree of interference in the internal affairs of these Arab countries, they opposed it bitterly. The doctrine was tested in 1957 and 1958 with the attempted Jordanian coup, backed by a pro-Nasser faction in the army, and by the war in Lebanon into which the U.S. intervened by sendi...