ANALYSES OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
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This research paper analyzes at different levels the origins, management and resolution, and consequences of the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. A careful study of all the material on that crisis which is now available suggests that no single level of analysis is adequate to explain the crisis. The thesis of this paper is: (1) while the immediate cause of the crisis was the Soviet decision to deploy secretly in Cuba medium range and intermediate range ballistic missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs, respectively), which produced a dangerous confrontation between the world's nuclear superpowers, misconceptions, misunderstandings and mistakes by both sides helped bring about the crisis and magnified its intensity; (2) although responsible statesmanship on both sides enabled them eventually to resolve the crisis short of war, actions each took during the crisis generated pressures and an escalatory dynamic which helped generate tensions which brought the world close to brink of nuclear conflict; and (3) even though war was avoided, the consequences of the crisis were mixed, and were neither as obvious nor as salutory as at first appeared to be the case. Conventional accounts in the United States at the time of the crisis and thereafter viewed the Soviet decision to place MRBMs and IRBMs in Cuba as an unprovoked act of Soviet aggression and in the Soviet Union as a legitimate effort by the Russians to defend the communist regime of Cuba which was under th
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ce and other sources, the Kennedy administration was reluctant to believe the obvious. It simply would not believe that the Soviets would embark on such a risky adventure. JFK approved the resumption of U-2 overflight missions which ultimately discovered MRBM sites in western Cuba, but only did so after John McCone, the CIA Director insisted. If the missiles had not been discovered in time, the Kennedy administration would have found itself in a even worse quandry than it in fact did after October 14.
Management of the Crisis
According to most conventional accounts at the time, JFK's management of the crisis was masterful, especially in bringing American military pressure to bear in removing the missiles while at the same time permitting tempers to cool and diplomacy to work while he found a way out of the crisis short of war. The truth is more complicated.
Phase I American Response and Soviet Reaction
American Decision to Impose a Naval Quarantine. JFK made the key American decisions with the advice of the Executive Committee (EXCOM) of the National Security Council. Although Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara held early on that the Soviet missiles in Cuba did not appreciably alter the Soviet-American nuclear balance, t
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Some common words found in the essay are:
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Approximate Word count = 3615
Approximate Pages = 14 (250 words per page)
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