The Cambodia Bombing
This is an excerpt from the paper...
On February 19, 1969, not long after Richard Nixon became President, the military command in Vietnam requested permission to commence a secret program of bombing operations within the borders of neighboring Cambodia (Shawcross, 1979, pp. 19ff). Naturally, this "secret" campaign was in no way secret from the people among whom the bombs were falling. It was "secret" only in two contexts; first, of "plausible deniability" in international diplomacy, and second probably a more important consideration of secrecy from Congressional and other opponents of the war within the United States. The bombing of Cambodia is of broad significance in several respects. First, and most narrowly, it was an escalation of the Vietnam war, of questionable legality, in bombing the territory of a neutral nation with which the U.S. was not at war, and had no mutual security arrangements that would permit such bombing. Second, it represented the characteristic features of U.S. military policy in Vietnam, in being an application of bombing over jungle terrain in which such measures were of questionable effectiveness. Third, it added fuel to the domestic fire of angry "debate" over the conduct and morality of the Vietnam War; the failure of the bombing campaign to achieve its desired results led directly to the ground "incursion" into Cambodia, in May of 1969. This incursion in turn led immediately to the Kent State killings of four college students (not all involved in antiwar protests; on
. . .
eyeball" simply cannot see through the triple canopy to identify and aim at targets on the ground.
Further exacerbating the problem was the nature of the enemy, in two vital respects. While the Iraqi army in Kuwait was by no means a "hightech" force, it was unquestionably a motorized, conventional Westernstyle army. Motor pools, supply and gasoline dumps, gasoline storage sites, all were concentrated targets well suited to air strikes. Moreover, it was relatively easy to judge the effects of air strikes on such targets (though U.S. planners, with bitter Vietnam experience behind them, tended to consistently underestimate damage done).
North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces operating in eastern Cambodia shared none of these "airfriendly" characteristics. For the most part, logistic support was either localized troops "living off the land," supported willingly or under compulsion by local populations or was provided mainly by human beings acting as porters. There were thus relatively few if any of the sorts of physical concentrations of materiel which could be identified by intelligence, targeted for strikes, and then evaluated for level of damage by poststrike reconnaissance.
As a result, to a fantastically gr
. . .
Some common words found in the essay are:
Persian Gulf, Khmer Rouge, Cambodia Shawcross, Gulf War, Vietnam War, Battle Somme, Bien Phu, South Vietnam, Viet Cong, Vietnam Cambodia, khmer rouge, secret bombing, persian gulf, air operations, bombing cambodia, south vietnam, north vietnamese, secret bombing cambodia, vietnam war, air strikes, rise khmer, rise khmer rouge, shawcross 1979 pp, persian gulf war, effective air power,
Approximate Word count = 3570
Approximate Pages = 14 (250 words per page)
More Essays on The Cambodia Bombing
|