"Stare decisis" is a Latin term that means "to stand by things decided." In the legal arena, therefore, stare decisis is essentially the doctrine of precedent, whereby courts rely on previously decided cases to guide their rulings in cases before them. What is often overlooked in discussion of stare decisis, however, is that there is both binding precedent (to which some courts must abide) and persuasive precedent (which courts may consider but ultimately ignore). This paper explores the doctrine of stare decisis and concludes that, though it may have its problems, it is not a doctrine that is ever likely to be completely removed from legal reasoning.
It should first be noted that stare decisis is a judicial rule or policy rather than a constitutional principle. One of the primary legal reasons for this rule is to provide some predictability or certain in judicial reasoning. For example, noted Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo wrote that "[i]t will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants and the opposite way between another. If a group of cases involves the same point, the parties expect the same decision. It would be a gross injustice to decide alternate cases on opposite principles. . . . Adherence to precedent must then be the rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the even-handed administration of justice in the courts."
On the other hand, there is a more pragmatic basis for the rule. For one thing, the rule makes it easier for judges to decide cases if they must be somewhat constrained by previous rulings in similar cases. This ease of administration, if you will, aids judicial efficiency and allows courts, to some extent, to dispose of cases more quickly than if they had to decide each case as though a similar issue had never come before them.
Essentially, the doctrine of stare decisis binds a court to rulings that are consistent with its rulings in...