It is apparent that the individual citizen has almost no influence on the direction of his government, and that the collective citizenry, or electorate, have only the vaguest control over it. This thesis is supported most convincingly by Anthony Downs in his article "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy." Downs' theory is based on the idea that we live in an egoistic rather than an altruistic world, in which all people act in a rational fashion to further their own interests with no irrational regard for the interests of others except as they may coincide with their own.
Downs' hypothesis is best stated in his own words:
"Political parties in a democracy formulate policy strictly as a means of gaining votes. They do not seek to gain office in order to carry out certain preconceived policies and serve any particular interest groups; rather they formulate policies and serve interest groups in order to gain office. Thus their social function - which is to formulate and carry out policies when in power as the government - is accomplished as a by-product of their own private motive - which is to attain the income, power, and prestige of being in office" (137).
In short, politicians make policies solely to get votes so they can remain in or attain office. Therefore, it would seem that their self-interest (which is their only motivation in this model), would best be served by doing what their constituents want.
At first glance, this statement appears to prove that the citizens of a democracy would indeed have a great deal of control over the actions of their government, but this would be a mistaken conclusion. Upon closer examination it becomes clear that this would only be the case if both the citizens and the politicians knew exactly what the citizens wanted the politicians to do. As Downs points out, this is simply not the way things are in a world like ours where knowledge is imperfect and in...