U.S. Policies in Vietnam

Directly or indirectly, the United States was militarily involved in Vietnam for roughly a quarter century (1949-1975). American policy was to contain worldwide communist expansion and in particular to prevent a communist takeover of South Vietnam by communist North Vietnam and Vietcong in the South. After concluding that indirect forms of economic and military assistance could not achieve that goal, the United States moved in 1965 from indirect to direct military involvement in combat operations in Vietnam. The basic military strategy of the United States was to conduct a war of attrition in South Vietnam by deploying large combat units against communist forces and by bombing North Vietnam. Only secondary attention was paid to pacification of the South Vietnamese countryside. After the Tet Offensive (January 1968), American policy shifted to reliance on Vietnamization, helping the South Vietnamese to defend themselves. Although lip service was paid to permitting South Vietnam a decent interval to save itself, America's primary objective evolved into staging its withdrawal in such a way as to preserve the integrity of America's global commitments and thereby, its credibility as a great power.

In the context of its role in the Cold War the United States had little choice but to attempt to defend South Vietnam

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the Achilles' heel of the allied effort" (435). The general ineffectiveness and instability of various ARVN juntas which followed Diem and further Viet Cong successes in its guerrilla war persuaded the administration of President Lyndon Johnson to order a gradual escalation of the American war effort in Vietnam in 1964-1967. This included an intensified bombing campaign in North Vietnam (Operation Rolling Thunder) and the introduction of large numbers of American ground troops which peaked at 536,000 in December 1968. American strategy in South Vietnam under General William Westmoreland featured large unit search-and-destroy missions designed to destroy over time the conventional military capability of the Viet Cong and the PLAF. Denied by LBJ and his Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara permission to invade North Vietnam, the Army decided the next best thing was to employ conventional war tactics which, however, proved ineffective in South Vietnam against an elusive enemy. Krepinevich said "it simply developed a strategy to suit the Army's preferred modus operandi, force structure, and doctrine" (166). When the Army came into contact with main force enemy units, it generally prevailed, as at the Battle of Ia Drang Valley in
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Approximate Pages = 10 (250 words per page)

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