U.S. Middle East Policy The revision of this paper required 10 ne

Issue Development and Research Objective

When I first began the research on the topic of American foreign policy towards the Middle East, I was persuaded by often conflicting, but nevertheless frequently persuasive, arguments that the basis of the policy was (1) preservation of American access to crude oil reserves in the Middle East, (2) the protection of the state of Israel, (3) the maintenance of a strategic position to counter the Soviet threat to the United States, and (4) the prevention of international terrorism. Considering, in isolation from one another, the justifications of these factors as bases for American policy toward the Middle East, it was possible to accept the soundness of many of the arguments. When the justifications for these factors were assessed in a holistic sense, however, American foreign policy toward the Middle East often appeared to be (1) internally inconsistent, and (2) reactive rather than proactiveat best. At worst, particularly during the first term of the Reagan Administration, it appeared at times as if the American government might be purposefully attempting to act against its own best interests in the Middle East (Haig, 1984).

As my research deepened, however, I detected what seemed to be an underlying objective of American foreign policy toward the Middle East from 1945 onward. Thus, I found it desirable to change the chronological focus of my research from the April 1979

peace exchange with respect to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Harkabi, 1988). There is no arguing, however, with people who believe that God has selected them for special privileges, and that one of those privileges was being given the land that encompasses not only the internationally officially recognized boundaries of the State of Israel, but also East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. As a result, it is unlikely that any government of Israel in the foreseeable future will voluntarily return the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Ishai, 1987). Rather, the present Likud government in Israel is bringing in Russian immigrants as quickly as is possible, and is settling them in the West Bank to make Israel's "presence there irreversible . . ." (BarIllan, 1988, p. 11). Further, the Likud government is pressing the United States to provide some US$13 billion to help pay for the settlement of Russian Jewish immigrants in the West Bank. In line with this policy, it is quite likely that an Israeli government will, at some point in the 1990s, annex both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Newman, 1982). It is also likely, however, that Israel will lose much of its American support, as the strategic value