This paper will provide a basic overview of the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. It will focus on the decision making process which led to the crisis, U.S. foreign policy, and an assessment of the crisis some three decades later.
Over the past decade, numerous previously classified documents have come to light regarding the events that led up to, took place during and after, and precipitated the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Commentary in the United States has focused almost entirely on the American experience of the event and the lessons learned, or which should have been learned, from the event. "In addition, the main reason so much attention has been given to the crisis is that it has rightly been regarded as the most intensive, dangerous, and climactic crisis of the cold war, and has thus become a unique historical source for the study of crisis management" (Garthoff 1). Moreover, in light of contemporary developments within the Soviet Union and new materials available under perestroika, as well as the reevaluation of missile technology in the 1990s, it becomes important to rethink once again the events of October 1962 and the precipice toward war that those events marginally avoided (Thomas 38-9).
First, it is important to note that although published accounts regarding the missile crisis justifiably center around the events occurring between the United States and the Soviet Union, there was a long and detailed precursor to the crisis itself. Since the early 1920s, policy had been hostile to the Soviet Union, viewing its Marxist Leninist revolution as hostile to the free world. In fact, it was not until the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt that the United States even opened diplomatic ties with the Soviets. Of course, there was a temporary thaw in relations during World War II, particularly since both countries were semi united in their pursuit of the defeat of fascism. After the war, however, a series of dipl...