1962 Cuban Missile Crisis

Over the past decade, numerous previously classified documents have come to light regarding the events that led up to, took place during and after, and precipitated the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Commentary in the United States has focused almost entirely on the American experience of the event and the lessons learned, or which should have been learned, from the event. "In addition, the main reason so much attention has been given to the crisis is that it has rightly been regarded as the most intensive, dangerous, and climactic crisis of the cold war, and has thus become a unique historical source for the study of crisis management" (Garthoff 1). Moreover, in light of contemporary developments within the Soviet Union and new materials available under perestroika, as well as the reevaluation of missile technology in the 1990s, it becomes important to rethink once again the events of October 1962 and the precipice toward war that those events marginally avoided (Thomas 38-9).

First, it is important to note that although published accounts regarding the missile crisis justifiably center around the events occurring between the United States and the Soviet Union, there was a long and detailed precursor to the crisis itself. Since the early 1

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oviet decision to place missiles in Cuba. First, Khrushchev may have installed missiles in Cuba intending to use then as a bargaining chip in an upcoming summit or in confrontation with Kennedy in the United Nations forum. This view holds that withdrawal of Soviet missiles in Cuba would be traded for withdrawal of U.S. missiles in Turkey. A second view holds that the missiles were little more than a diversion, the Soviets hoping the United States would respond aggressively toward Cuba, thus increasing the likelihood of a U.S./NATO split. Third, after the Bay of Pigs, both the Soviets and Cubans may have seriously believed that the United States would mount another invasion of Cuba. There was certainly a basis for this view, particularly since conservative congressmembers were eager to suggest the action. If the United States were to attack Cuba, only the presence of strong defensive weaponry might prevent Castro's downfall. Fourth, Khrushchev may have perceived that the American populace was too weak to confront the Soviets directly. Cold War tensions were high, and since the United States had failed, in Khrushchev's view, to decisively act in other parts of the world, missiles in Cuba would insure Soviet domination. Fina
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Approximate Word count = 1719
Approximate Pages = 7 (250 words per page)

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