1a. Hume holds that provable knowledge of miracles is an empirical impossibility. As a matter of logic, and by the evidence of natural law, one must reject the notion that miracles are manifest in the physical universe. Hume's definition of miracle is that it "is a violation of the laws of nature" (Hume 300). Nothing that one can assert about miracles can be proven except the partiality, credulity, or delusional quality of reporters of miracles, says Hume. When he says that "a religionist may be an enthusiast, and imagine he sees what has no reality" (302), he is specifically arguing that miracles not only do not provide evidence of the truth of traditional Christian theism but also actively argue against such truth. This is amplified by the documentation of forgeries and deliberate deceptions of the credulous and uneducated.
Along the same lines, Hume (303) argues that miracle stories arise "among ignorant and barbarous nations" on one hand, or in connection with legendary stories on the other. Miracles, Hume says sarcastically, "never happen in our days," which argues that Christian theism is not equal to the task of proving its truth by means of miracle but is capable of producing Christians who tell lies about miracles. Further, conflicting accounts of supposed witnesses to miracles on one hand, or partisan accounts of miracles by conflicting religions (e.g., Islam and Christianity) on the other, support the view that miracle stories cannot be trusted to account for any religious truth, Christian included. Accounts of miracles presented by one religion, which are meant to support the truth of that religion, refute such accounts by any other religion, which looks to miracles to support its own truth. In other words, rival miracle doctrines cancel each other out precisely because they all claim to be based on absolute religious truth.
Lewis's position on the connection between miracles and Christian theism is not to argue posi...