avy-industry expertise such as building railroads and developing international markets.
In France, the similarity to Britain comes in the fact of industrialization, particularly of textiles, and in the fact that, once under way, French industrial production and profits to the industrial sector progressed rapidly, despite retarded beginnings because of various wars from the Revolution (1789-92), to the Franco-Prussian war (1870-71).
In Germany, industrialization was similar to Britain's because it grew out of "conscious imitation and borrowing" (243) from Britain, France, and Belgium and their investment in Germany. The highly developed industrial base extended to foreign markets (and later territories). As in Britain, Germany's railroad was decisive for giving the economy a critical mass, even though the bulk of the mass so to speak turned out to be in iron, steel, and (especially) coal in the Ruhr.
Belgium differed from Britain in the fact that it made use of industrial espionage (British technology) to accomplish key early mechanization gains. It also made more extensive use of foreign capital, particularly from France, to develop a whole range of industries, from ore refineries to textile mills.
France differed from Britain in two key respects. First there was a relative scarcity of coal, which meant that coal developed toward the end of the 19th century, not the beginning. Second, industrial enterprises of France were relatively smaller in size than in Britain. Compared to Britain, France did not urbanize to a great extent. Another difference, which Cameron describes (238) but which he does not analyze in detail, is that France's most fully developed industries (chemicals, glass, porcelain, paper, photography, metallurgy) were downline enterprises--that is, of note because of their quality. France's industrial development achieved a critical mass by the end of the 19th century, so that, even after the Franco-Prussian Wa...