The German Sixth Army at Stalingrad

This research paper analyzes the reasons for the German defeat at the Battle of Stalingrad during World War II. The German Sixth Army and Axis allied and relief formations were destroyed at Stalingrad because at critical junctures during the summer and fall of 1942 and the early winter of 1942-43, Adolf Hitler and the rest of the German High Command as well as some field commanders, notably Friedrich von Paulus, Sixth Army's commander at Stalingrad, were outgeneraled, outfoxed, outmaneuvered, outfought and even outproduced by their Soviet counterparts.

After smashing an ill-conceived Soviet offensive in the Kharkov area in May, the Wehrmacht made broad advances in June-August in southern Russia. The Germans captured Sevastopol in the Crimea, swept through the coal rich Donetz (Donbas) Basin and arrived at the gates of Stalingrad. However, Hitler and his generals fell victim to unwarranted overconfidence. In late July they revised their originally sound strategic plan and split their forces between Stalingrad and the Caucasus oil fields.

This decision coupled with the Soviets' tenacious defense of Stalingrad in September-October slowed the German advance and bogged down von Paulus' forces in urban warfare sufficiently to permit the Soviets to plan, organize and mount a powerful counteroffensive which trapped Sixth Army in Stalingrad in late November. This amounted to a massive German intelligence failure and both a

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step back" Order No. 227 on July 29 (Glantz & House, 1995, p. 121). Substantial Soviet reinforcements were sent to the Stalingrad front. Zhukov advised Stalin that the city had to hold for at least 45 days before a counter-offensive could be launched. In fact, the counter-offensive was not ready until November 19. Bullock opined that if Paulus had retained the 4th Panzer Army, he "could probably have taken the city quite easily in July, but by the time it was brought back Russian resistance was stiffening" (p. 781). In response to a direct order from Hitler, Paulus launched his first full-scale attack on Stalingrad in late August which followed a two day incendiary raid on the city of August 23-24 which killed 40,000 civilians and converted much of the city center into smoldering ruins. Overy said that "how the Red Army survived in Stalingrad [before its counter-offensive, Operation Uranus] defies military explanation" (p. 177). One factor was the nature of the terrain, which Kilzer described as "thirty-three miles of man-made obstacles; masonry buildings and factories that could and would provide cover and camouflage" and which turned the city into a gigantic tank trap (pp. 131-132). Russians in the city fought with incredib
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Approximate Word count = 2737
Approximate Pages = 11 (250 words per page)

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