Charles, or Karl, XII (1682-1718)
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Charles, or Karl, XII (1682-1718) was the second and last absolute ruler of Sweden. Though many regard him as a great man his greatness lay in directions that proved to be disastrous for the Swedish empire. Charles was a soldier of extraordinary abilities whose good qualities in war were overbalanced by the lack of political astuteness, adaptability, and diplomatic tact that were badly needed by European monarchs of the early eighteenth century. Charles plunged Sweden into the Great Northern War less than 3 years after he ascended to the throne at the age of 15 and, for the next 18 years, to the end of his life, he never returned to Stockholm. In his years of fighting, of near-captivity in Turkey, and of his long ride to freedom across Europe, Charles displayed the bravery, single-mindedness and ingenuity that made him almost legendary as a soldier-king. Simultaneously, however, he could never negotiate, adapt or persuade when these options might have saved Sweden's possessions and returned him to home and throne, allowing him to live longer than a mere 36 years. The principal purpose of the empire Sweden had assembled around the Baltic Sea was to use the nation's military power and domination of various ports to suppress alternate outlets for the trade of Russia and Poland in the hope "that ever more goods could be attracted or forced to come to Europe across" Sweden's territories, thereby adding immensely to the income that was already produced for Sweden by the ter
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ggression (Hatton 649). But in 1689 Denmark had pulled back in view of threats from the English and the Dutch and war had been averted. Thus when, in 1700, the young king heard of new Danish assaults on Holstein-Gottorp's territories he saw "no particular cause for alarm" (Oakley 112).
But this was quickly followed by the worst possible combination of events as a situation occurred that Swedish diplomacy had long struggled to prevent--"a coalition of her immediate neighbors with the object of divesting her of her empire and partitioning it among themselves" (Oakley 112). The coalition of Denmark, Saxony-Poland and Russia had agreed to mount a three-front attack on Sweden's possessions. Frederick IV's invasion of Sleswig-Holstein was soon followed by Peter of Russia's invasion of the Baltic provinces and the entry into Swedish Livonia of Augustus II, King of Poland and Elector of Saxony. Sweden was surrounded and Charles' "only solution was the sword" but, while the "diplomacy of delay" might have served Sweden's interests better, Charles did not even try such a course "until all was already lost" (Scott 226-27). The great problem was that Russia was, like Sweden, threatened on three fronts and Peter was determined to conti
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Some common words found in the essay are:
Estates Scott, Charles XI, Russians Charles', Domestic Sweden, Sweden Charles, Unfortunately Charles, English Dutch, Dnieper River, Russia Poland, Karl XII, charles xii, charles xi, hatton 669, charles learned, king sweden, decisive victory, sweden's possessions, russian force, scott 225, defeat augustus,
Approximate Word count = 2474
Approximate Pages = 10 (250 words per page)
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