NAFTA AND THE US CONGRESSIONAL SYSTEM This rese

This research paper analyzes and evaluates the operation of the U.S Congressional system in considering and acting upon the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the fall of 1993 and subsequent Congressional monitoring of the effects of NAFTA. After a divisive political controversy, Congress approved NAFTA by a sizeable margin as a result of intensive lobbying efforts of a centrist coalition led by the Clinton administration and the Congressional leadership of the Republican Party. The truncated legislative process involved led to inadequate discussion of the underlying substantive issues and grossly exaggerated claims and statements made by many NAFTA supporters and detractors. Subsequent events have generally chilled for the time being any moves by Congress to modify NAFTA or to cooperate with efforts by the administration to extend to other Latin American nations NAFTA-type access to the American market.

Background to the Controversy Over NAFTA of Late 1993

During the closing months of the Bush administration, the NAFTA agreements negotiated with Canada and Mexico provided for the gradual phasing out trade barriers among those countries and the United States over the succeeding 15 years. Duty reductions between the United States and Canada were not a major topic of controversy. The percentage of U.S.-Mexico trade which would be free of tariffs under NAFTA was as follows:

U.S. imports from Mexico U.S. exports to M

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he Minority Whip in the House. Although Big Business strongly backed NAFTA, support among rank and file Republicans was not strong. In fact, Broder reported that a Washington Post/ ABC News poll after the House vote on NAFTA showed that only 33 percent of registered Republicans favored its approval (A 29). A major part of the administration's efforts, which took the form of a media blitz, was the attempt to influence the Congress by shaping public opinion. President Clinton launched this campaign on September 14, 1993 by briefing Congressional leaders at a public meeting at which former Presidents Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter and George Bush expressed their support for NAFTA. By the time it was over, what Blumenthal calls "this gigantic political campaign," involved almost all industrial and trade associations in the country, 16 Nobel Prize winning and more than 250 other economists, Lee Iacocca, the former head of Chrysler, leading media consulting firms and statements by the President of Mexico and other U.S. trading partners, all orchestrated by the administration (Blumenthal 80-90; and Lauter A18). The high point of the administration's public relations strategy came after Vice President Al Gore was perceived by most listeners
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Approximate Word count = 2688
Approximate Pages = 11 (250 words per page)