Kripke's Causal Theory The purpose of this rese

The purpose of this research is to examine the utility of Kripke's causal theory and his new theory of reference (NTR) in regard to its ability to account for logical difficulties inherent in the more traditional theories of naming. The plan of the research will be to set forth summary evaluations of what can be seen to be the limitation of traditional theories, chiefly those of Frege and Russell, in regard to their accounting for aspects of reference, and to discuss ways in which Kripke's theory appears to account for such aspects. Additionally, apparent limitations of Kripke's approach will be discussed in regard to the NTR's ability to interpret certain kinds of expressions.

There are two main features of both traditional theories of logical analysis of proper names and NTR: interpretation of meaning and referring in general and interpretation of statements of existence in particular. Sometimes, such interpretations appear to coincide, and other times, they appear to work at cross purposes. In this regard, we can recall Strawson's criticism, cited in Chapter IV, that in Russell's analysis of a statement such as "the king of France is bald," Russell mixes questions of the reference of an entity with questions of its existence. This point will be developed more fully below.

Various theorists seek to use language in such a way as to make their interpretations incorrigible. From Frege and Russell among the modern "classical" theorists, through Straw

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f existence or nonexistence as well as of referring or nonreferring. One aspect of this arises from Russell's declarations about what is and is not appropriate ordinary or analytical language. One response to this is that just because Russell declares the form this exists to be ungrammatical does not mean (1) that users of ordinary language will discontinue the locution, however improper or insignificant it may be from a logically analytical standpoint; or (2) that the propositional form itself cannot be subjected to logical analysis and found wanting. Ayer's own conclusion that Russell's logical analysis of the limitations of ordinary language is valuable, even though it does not necessarily cover all cases in which ordinary language may function. It may seem easy to dismiss out of hand the prevalence of ordinary-language usage in regard to Russell's theory of descriptions. When Russell says that logic is concerned with the real world, "just as truly as zoology, though with its more abstract and general features," his point is that the language of logical analysis (in particular the theory of descriptions as opposed to the problematic use of proper names) provides a way of thinking and talking about imaginary creatures and obje

Category: Philosophy - K