An Experientialist Ethics
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G. Michael BlahnikÆs Experientialist Ethics: A Comparative Study advances an ethical framework that is contingent upon a unique version of experientialism. BlahnikÆs experientialist ethics ultimately assumes that as experiential beings, it is only in experience that reality may be ascertained. In this, experience equals reality. This controversial view will certainly rankle those theorists that purport that experience is merely one componentùand an often misleading one at thatùin a larger network of human functions that are in fact capable of perceiving reality. One must consider whether ômereö experience is enough to generate and sustain epistemological conclusions of any real weight, as well as whether the conclusions experientialism can engender are the right ones. If experience equals reality, one might suggest, then reality itself is little more than a collection of conflicting sensations. In this, the experiential reality of Blahnik has little ethical force and no normative thrust whatsoever. What help, then, can the individual actor hope to receive from (as Rousseau once put it) illusions that deceive no one but himself? Blahnik, however, shows that the opposite can be true, and that the experientialist ethic can be rich in its prescriptions. Blahnik explains in his introduction that ôExperience is defined as the necessary combination of cognition, affect, behavior, sensations, the æphysicalÆ environment, and the æIÆö (v). In this, he is creating a thi
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g comes to us from ôoutside of experienceö (x). In this, Blahnik seems to indicate that if we can think it up, then it already exists for us from within the structure of experience. This is a catch-all that serves experientialists well, and binds human beings together as experiential beings. Curiously, a commitment to this notion does not likewise commit Blahnik to the idea that nothing can exist beyond our range of experiential structures; rather, if something does exist beyond our ken, this is basically ônot a matter of concernö to us. The moment we perceive that something ôrealö or ônewö appears to be outside of our experiential structure (for example, a ôlife form ten thousand light years away from usö), we are mistaken: we are not in fact perceiving anything beyond our experiential structure at all. On the contrary, we are experiencing a belief that this thing exists, and this belief in turn ôexists as a part of the experiential structure within which we participateö(x). Put simply, ôAll validation of beliefs occur within experienceö (xii).
These ideas place all ethical, moral, even religious sensibilities firmly within the realm of the experiential structure. This endows every individual with a deep wellspring of p
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Approximate Word count = 1391
Approximate Pages = 6 (250 words per page)
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