Despite campaigning for his first full term in office as a candidate for peace in 1964, by 1965 President Johnson declared in reference to Vietnam, ôWe will not be defeated. We will not grow tired. We will not withdraw,ö (Buzzanco, p. 75). Despite the doubt of some of his top advisors, President Johnson escalated the war in Vietnam in 1965. Many of JohnsonÆs top advisors, like Robert McNamara, former secretary of state Dean Rusk, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, encouraged escalation of the war, at least initially. While Johnson and his advisors maintained victory in Vietnam was necessary to stop the spread of Communist influence in the region, many contend the escalation of the war encompassed arrogance, political aims, and the deliberate deception of the U.S. public.
Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk counseled President Johnson that he felt the war was impossible to win for the U.S. While General Westmoreland and Robert McNamara often encouraged Johnson to aggressively pursue victory in Vietnam, even McNamara and some of the Chiefs of Staff began to voice doubts to Johnson about ultimate victory. Despite these concerns, Johnson (p. 178) argued that American needed to be in Vietnam, ôWe must fight if we are to live in a world where every country can shape its own destiny.ö
Despite the doubts of his advisors, Johnson felt that the interests and security of America were linked to the interests and security of South Vietnam. Johnson also believed not only that victory was a means of halting the spread of Communist influence in the region, but he also felt that China was involved in the struggle as part of a larger pattern of aggression. JohnsonÆs (p. 180) view was founded on his belief that American has a ôpromise to keepö to South Vietnam, since it had been supporting the government and its people for over a decade by then. Because of the dual threats of China and the Soviet Union, Johnson also felt the U.S. m...