The purpose of this research is to examine the distinction between knowledge and opinion made by Plato through Socrates with reference to the Euthyphro and Apology dialogues, and the way in which that distinction, which appears to be consistent throughout Plato's work, impinges on Plato's belief that the life of philos ophy is the best type of life. The plan of the research will be to show how the conclusions of the Euthyphro point toward the injustice of the verdict discussed in the Apology and reinforce the integrity of Socrates's choice between a life lived with consistent reference to wisdom and philosophy and no life at all.
In the Euthyphro, Socrates is waiting to be prosecuted by Meletus for impiety--specifically atheism and corruption of Athenian youth. His friend Euthyphro is on his way to prosecute his own father for murder of a slave, basing his case on his certain knowledge of what the gods want. Socrates draws Euthyphro out on his knowledge of the gods, repeatedly stating that he will use what he learns to escape Meletus's indictment (105) and urge Meletus to prosecute instead Euthyphro, who will have been responsible for Socrates's understanding of knowledge of the gods (94). But in Euthyphro Socrates shows that the more certain one is of what one knows, the more likely it is that what one thinks he knows is something he only has an opinion about.
Euthyphro is relevant to the Apology because Meletus has accused Socrates of "improvising and innovating about the divine" (94b), and because what Socrates essentially teaches Euthyphro about unexamined opinions and opinions masquerading as knowledge, especially the kind of knowledge of the gods that leads Meletus to so confidently accuse Socrates of atheism, is taken up as a philosophical principle in the Apology in the famous declaration that the unexamined life is not worth living. In the course of the Euthyphro it becomes clear that Euthyphro's knowledge is really an o...