The purpose of this paper is to discuss Harold GarfinkelÆs critique of normative determinism as a philosophical element in the work of Talcott Parsons. It will draw out some implications of GarfinkelÆs work for both sociology and the philosophy of science. The backdrop for GarfinkelÆs work is, of course, that of Talcott Parsons, in whose newly formed Department of Social Relations at Harvard Garfinkel enrolled as a doctoral student in 1946.
To ParsonsÆ groundbreaking thesis that sociology needed a theoretical structure equivalent to that which mathematics began to provide for physics in GalileoÆs day, Garfinkel later entered a respectful antithesis that pursued the same ultimate goal of creating a truly scientific sociology, but along different methodological lines. The reverberations of this dialogue, which has taken place in the arena of and in continuity with the central traditions of Western philosophy, continue down to the present.
ParsonsÆ agenda of creating a scientific sociology--a discipline that would function as a social science rather than as one of the humanities--began by identifying the data for study, the methodologies for study, the procedures for creating models, hypotheses, experiments, theories, etc., in ways that paralleled mathematical physics as closely as possible. The goal was to be able to create objective descriptions and quantifiable predictions of human behavior that would be to some extent replicable and that would as far as possible not depend on subjective states of consciousness. ParsonsÆ theoretical model for creating such descriptions was based in large part on Freudian psychology.
Parsons created a model of what one might call ôsociological man,ö parallel to the ôeconomic manö on which classical economic theory is based. For ôsociological man,ö decisions were dictated by social norms that had been incorporated, internalized, and implemented without hindrance by doubts o...