Normative Determinism
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The purpose of this paper is to discuss Harold GarfinkelÆs critique of normative determinism as a philosophical element in the work of Talcott Parsons. It will draw out some implications of GarfinkelÆs work for both sociology and the philosophy of science. The backdrop for GarfinkelÆs work is, of course, that of Talcott Parsons, in whose newly formed Department of Social Relations at Harvard Garfinkel enrolled as a doctoral student in 1946. To ParsonsÆ groundbreaking thesis that sociology needed a theoretical structure equivalent to that which mathematics began to provide for physics in GalileoÆs day, Garfinkel later entered a respectful antithesis that pursued the same ultimate goal of creating a truly scientific sociology, but along different methodological lines. The reverberations of this dialogue, which has taken place in the arena of and in continuity with the central traditions of Western philosophy, continue down to the present. ParsonsÆ agenda of creating a scientific sociology--a discipline that would function as a social science rather than as one of the humanities--began by identifying the data for study, the methodologies for study, the procedures for creating models, hypotheses, experiments, theories, etc., in ways that paralleled mathematical physics as closely as possible. The goal was to be able to create objective descriptions and quantifiable predictions of human behavior that would be to some extent replicable and that would as far as possible not d
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llyö rational conduct had drawn attention away from whether actions are ôreasonableö by common-sense standards and had also created an inappropriate emphasis on normative determinism. Garfinkel denied that normative rules, no matter how thoroughly internalized, could determine an individualÆs conduct, or that intersubjective knowledge is founded upon such rules (Heritage, 1984, p. 33-34).
Whereas Parsons had thought that the reflexive aspects of actorsÆ orientations were an obstacle to the maintenance (and explanation) of social order and had therefore attempted to marginalize them as epiphenomenal, Garfinkel argued that such cognitive functions are instead critical to the maintenance of social order. Furthermore, Garfinkel rejected absolutely the assumption that the ordinary judgments of ordinary social actors can ever be discounted or dismissed as irrelevant or epiphenomenal in the analysis of social action or social organization. Heritage (1984) says the following on this point:
[I]t is the Parsonian disregard for the entire common-sense world in which ordinary actors choose courses of action on the basis of detailed practical considerations and judgments which are intelligible and accountable to others, which ultimately con
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Approximate Word count = 2622
Approximate Pages = 10 (250 words per page)
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