The Challenger Disaster

ôWhy did the space shuttle Challenger explode? Many people assume it was because of poorly-functioning O rings on the booster rocket. However, those O rings didnÆt send that ship up on a cold winterÆs morn. People didàö (Tognazzini, 1996).

When the space shuttle Challenger exploded on January 28, 1986, speculation about the cause of the disaster was frenzied. The last thing anyone wanted to believe was that the tragedy could be the result of willful human negligence. However, extensive evidence supporting such a view came out immediately following the tragedy and continues to surface. The Challenger was launched into space despite a series of technical difficulties that delayed the launch several times and despite ominous warnings from senior technical staff. The decision-making that led to the tragedy and the ethics those decisions were grounded in are disturbing and illuminating.

ôFrom the beginningàShuttle Mission 51L was plagued by problems.ö (Greene, 2004). From the time the Challenger was first scheduled to lift off on January 22 until it was finally launched on January 28, liftoff was delayed several times for various reasons, culminating in the final delay due to icicles on the structure that supports the shuttle. All these delays gave NASA plenty of time to rethink the launch, and behind the scenes, two men were urgently recommending that it be halted.

Roger Boisjoly, an engineer with Morton Th

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r., 1986). Under this investigation, the decision-making problems behind the Challenger disaster finally came to light. ôRogers said he felt the decision-making process was seriously flawed, chiefly in that the highest levels of NASA seemed not to have been warned adequately of the hazards of launching in cold weather, nor told emphatically enough of the need to redesign the O-rings that sealed joints of the solid-fuel rocket. æThe underlying problem which led to the Challenger accident was not poor communication or inadequate procedures as implied by the Rogers commission conclusion. Rather, the fundamental problem was poor technical decision-making over a period of several years by top NASA and contractor personnel, who failed to act decisively to solve the increasingly serious anomalies in the Solid Rocket Booster joints,Æ the House panel's report said.ö (Clayton, Jr., 1986). "Signals were overlooked, people were silenced," the report charged. Communication did not flow effectively up and down the formal chain of command, it concluded, in part because NASA was not following its own rules. "Cultural traits and organizational practices detrimental to safety were allowed to develop, includingàlack of integrated management across
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Approximate Pages = 5 (250 words per page)

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