tegic interests in Cuba, these in a sense were negative. American naval and military power in the Caribbean was completely predominant, not only compared to local forces but also to the forces that European powers could project into the region. The US therefore did not require local allies to serve in more than a constabulary role, defending economic interests against local threats.
These conditions, which applied not only to Cuba but also to the Caribbean and Central America generally (with the exceptions of a few longestablished British or European colonies), provided an optimal environment for neoimperialism. On the one hand, the US had numerous economic interests in the region. Moreover, these interests were largely in agricultural exports.
These were most effectively served by aligning with, or promoting the formation of, local agrarian elites. These elites dominated local government, which thus was characteristically antidemocratic and authoritarian, due to their interest in securing large amounts of cheap labor (Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, p. 8). The clientstate governments provided forces to defend the local agrarian elites and ensure that agricultural wages remained low.
The client governments thus also served the American agricultural exportimport interests whose clients the local elites effectively were (Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, p. 166). If local means of repression proved inadequate, the US Marines could be sent to "restore order." At the same time, since the countries involved were formally independent and rarely subject to foreign majorpower threats the general American public had little interest in them or awareness of them. Domestic US public opinion thus generated only limited and sporadic pressure on policymakers to take responsibility for the quality of their governance.
A nation that takes pride in democratic political institutions, and which possesse...