Overview of the Paradox of Categorization
The Paradox of Categorization was identified by Lisa F. Barrett (2006) as the paradox which occurs because people believe that they know an emotion when they see it and, consequently, tend to assume that emotions are nothing more than discrete events that can be recognized with some degree of accuracy. Scientists have yet to produce, said Barrett (2006), a set of clear and (most significantly, perhaps) consistent criteria for indicating when an emotion is present and when it is not. However, in reality, emotions often are somewhat blurred; observations of emotions are often categorized as revealing anger, sadness, joy, fear, and so forth, but in actuality emotions are elusive and tend to defy clear definition. The categorization of affect, therefore, is often guided by knowledge about emotion acquired from prior experience, then tailored to the presenting situation, and designed as Barrett (2006) commented, for action. Categorizing affect places a person in a state that corresponds to the notion that one has an emotion.
This particular paradox presents challenges to objectivity in many different ways. First, and perhaps most significantly, it results in the attribution of a specific state of affective arousal that may or may not be accurate. Such an attribution may be non-objective, neutral, or highly subjective (Barrett, 2006). The result of such an attribution can be the misreading of affective states and the clouding of subsequent judgments. This may be a particularly significant problem in terms of certain types of observational research, in which the observations of affective state made by the researcher/observer function as the basis for any conclusions that are to be drawn.
Indeed, one can also argue that the categorization of emotion itself is a process by means of which the psychological state of the person (or researcher) making the judgment can also be iden...