e firebombing of Japanese cities produced none of the guilty self-reflection and criticism which accompanied the British firebombing of German cities.
Something else had become apparent to American commanders and soldiers: Japanese troops tended to resist fanatically rather than surrender when defeat appeared imminent. This trait appeared to be a part of the Japanese national psyche, as evidenced by the belligerent and defiant statements issued by the government throughout the last year of the war. The unconditional surrender of the Japanese therefore seemed impossible without an invasion and occupation of the Japanese home islands. In light of the fierce fighting which had raged on Iwo Jima and Okinawa, American leaders viewed the projected invasion of Japan with trepidation.
If any Allied leaders thought that the war with Japan could be ended through some sort of inducements or negotiation, they were hamstrung by the stated Allied objective of unconditional surrender. This demand originated in the Cairo Declaration of 1943, where the Allies made clear that the end of the war could only come about through the unconditional surrender of the Axis powers. This demand was made in reaction to the aftermath of the First World War, in which the Germans claimed that they had surrendered under the terms of the Fourteen Points but had been forced to sign something entirely different. Because this resentment had led to German rearmament and expansionism under Hitler, the Allies decided that no such misunderstanding would occur after the end of the Second World War; no political promises would be given in exchange for surrender.
The problem was that the German and Japanese situations were different. A part of the European continent, Germany had to commit all of its forces in large land battles on two fronts; by the time the Allies reached the German borders, much of this force had either been destroyed or exhausted in heavy f...