v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), Justice Louis Brandeis stated the classic position of the Court, namely, that the rights of free speech "are not in their nature absolute. Their exercise is subject to restriction . . . if . . . required in order to protect the state from destruction or from serious injury, political, economic or moral."
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), Justice Frank Murphy announced for the Court that also excluded from the protection of the First Amendment were 'insulting or fighting words,' which he defined as "those that by their very utterance inflict injury or intend to incite a breach of the peace." In another decision, Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952), the Court decided that libelous utterances directed at social groups were not protected by the First Amendment.
Further Judicial Protection of Verbal Assaults as Free Speech
Ironically, it was the Supreme Court headed by Chief Justice Earl Warren, which did so much to expand the constitutional rights of racial minorities in areas such as school desegregation and criminal procedure, that fatally undermined the fighting words and group libel doctrines of the Chaplinski and Beauharnais cases. The evolution of constitutional law in this area can be seen from a review of Supreme Court cases which involved racist speeches or remarks by extremist groups and individuals.
1. The neo-Nazi cases. In the late 1970s, the Chicago branch of the American Nazi Party attempted to stage a parade and a rally, which involved anti-Semitic speeches, swastikas, SS uniforms and jackboots in Skokie, Illinois, a predominantly Jewish community with numerous survivors of the German Nazi death camps. The city of Skokie invoked a local ordinance to seek an injunction against these activities. The local Federal District Court denied the injunction on the grounds that the racial slurs involved were a form of free speech protected by the First Am...