that we would behave solely based on our passions. In a stable social environment, however, we operate out of a disinterested sympathy. When we were living in the natural state, the more primitive state, it could not be required of us that we keep promises, for the force of the passions that govern us are essentially selfish in nature. This means the involvement of our self-interest. When we are expected to keep promises, for instance, what governs us is impartiality and disinterestedness. Hume does not say that our natural duties, our uncultivated ideas of morality, those which conform to our partiality in some sense, cease to function in a stable society, for they do not. Hume refers to actions that arise from our inclinations as moral duties, including among them such things as love of children or pity for those less fortunate than ourselves. However, he also says that an appeal to such natural inclinations cannot be used to explain why we should keep promises. Yet, Hume is most interested in the motivations which can be seen as bringing about such things as keeping promises. Hume finds obligation as deriving from the function of reason, custom, and convention in a stable society. Such motives as develop are artificial, a motive brought about through the application of reason or custom. Keeping a promise is an action with such a motive, and keeping a promise is not motivated by a regard for the moral worth of the action itself.
Hume's approach is too imprecise and artificial in its own right to serve as a rationale for keeping a promise. Kant's view of acting in a given way so as to make that a universal law has more value as a reason for making ethical decisions and for deciding on ethical actions. Kant makes a stronger case for his point of view, and it serves a more directly valuable function for those trying to put it into action.
3. The story of Heart of Darkness involves the journey made by Marlow to find Ku...