he Court's implicit rule has been that if an action appears to endorse religious beliefs, the action is unconstitutional. If an action does not endorse or benefit religious beliefs, and has no effect, it is constitutional (Peltrason, 1994, pp. 192-194).
When the religious endorsement principle, as discussed above, is applied to the Lancer case, the neighbors may have additional grounds for complaint. Mr. Lancer's highly visible cross and neon sign are not neutral. They endorse specific religious beliefs and have an effect. Their existence is viewed as hostile and provocative by the majority of Mr. Lancer's neighbors. Further, the highly visible way in which Mr. Lancer has chosen to express his religious views with the 40-foot lighted cross and the neon sign can give the impression, albeit an erroneous one, that his neighbors share his religious beliefs. This impression creates conflicts and a hostile atmosphere.
When the Court deals with free exercise claims, issues surrounding the definition of religion do arise. The most critical question is who should define religious beliefs: the government, the court, or the individual? The Supreme Court does outweigh free exercise claims despite their coercive effect on religious beliefs and practices (O'Brien, p. 748).
For example, in Reynolds v. United States, 90 U.S. 145 (1879), the Court upheld a congressional statute banning and punishing polygamy which Mormons practiced as a religious belief. In the case of the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 113 S.Ct. 2217 (1993), a city ban on animal sacrifice was struck down by the Court because the city failed to meet the neutrality and generally applicability, and narrower regulation requirements established by the Court (O'Brien, 1995, pp. 777-783).
As part of their response to this on-going dilemma presented in the Reynolds case (1879), the Court observed that religion is not defined in the constitutio...