Air Strategies in 1973 Arab-Israeli War
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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the air strategies used in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. This war is also known as the October War, although Arabs refer to it as the Ramadan War, while the Israelis call it the Yom Kippur War. The conflict began on October 6, 1973, with Egyptian and Syrian attacks against Israeli-held territories in the Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights. Although the Arab forces had strong air defenses in the early part of the war, they were never able to develop an air strategy to maintain the offensive. By contrast, the Israelis made effective use of air power in order to carry out a series of counteroffensives against the Arabs. This was a decisive factor in Israel's attainment of the initiative during the course of the war. In turn, the efficient use of air power led to a successful outcome for Israel at the conclusion of the war. This paper will compare the strategies of both sides in the war, as well as the role played by air power in the implementation of those strategies. Elements such as objective, doctrine, technology, resources, and leadership will be compared, as well as the adherence by each side to the basic principles of air warfare. In this way, the factors causing the Israeli success will be contrasted with those which led to the Arab failure. The conclusion of this paper will provide suggestions regarding how the Arabs may have reversed their fortunes in the war. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War was chosen as the sub
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ial numbers in terms of manpower. For example, the Syrian army on the northern front was supplemented by units from Morocco, Iraq and Jordan (Hofton, 1973, p. 140). However, these units were not used to their full effect at the start of Israeli counterattacks in the area. There was a lack of communication between the units, as well as a lack of logistical support for their efforts (Dupuy, 1975, p. 148). In addition, the troops were not used to their full advantage in terms of maintaining the Arab initiative. The outcome of the war might have been different "had King Hussein of Jordan been prepared to open up a third front" (Hofton, 1973, p. 141). Had a third front been opened, the IAF would certainly have been distracted from its relentless attack on Syrian targets.
Israel's material resources began to decline drastically after a few days of fighting. In response to this situation, the United States began "Operation Nickel Grass" on October 13, for the purpose of resupplying its Israeli allies. Altogether, the U.S. sent 22,305 tons of equipment and supplies to Israel, a figure that far exceeded the Soviet airlift of approximately 15,000 tons to the Arab nations (Krisinger, 1989, p. 165). The U.S. airlift to Israel incl
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Approximate Word count = 6255
Approximate Pages = 25 (250 words per page)
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