nment action, it had a more difficult task in establishing standing. The plaintiff had argued that it had standing because the action would endanger certain species abroad in foreign animal preserves and that it had intentions of returning to these preserves at some undefined point in the future. Scalia's opinion said that this was insufficient to support a finding of actual or imminent injury to itself. In a concurrence, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Souter, said that different circumstances may support a similar nexus theory, but not in this case. In dissent, Justices Blackmun and O'Connor said that a reasonable finder of fact could conclude that the plaintiff will soon return to the foreign project sites, even though it had no concrete plans to do so. Requiring such plans is an empty formality.
The Court's trends in standing are hard to gauge. Generally, conservative justices are more restrictive in granting standing to plaintiffs than liberal justices. However, these cases must be analyzed on their individual fact patterns. Lujan involved an unusual situation in that the plaintiff was trying to assert standing based upon a possible relationship. In addition, it has been suggested that the Court's opinion in Lujan is largely based upon Justice Scalia's own views on the subject and that a liberal change in the composition of the Court would effectively undermine the precedential value of Lujan. It should be especially noted that while Lujan was a 7-2 decision, only Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices White and Thomas joined in Scalia's opinion and Justice White has since retired. The two additions to the Court since the opinion, Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, are notably more liberal than Justice White.
For the present term, he Court has agreed to decide whether parties opposing the designation of endangered species in a particular case have standing to challenge government actions under the law. This argument is...